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Preface
In the 15 years since the declaration 
of a ‘war on terror’ and the invasions 
of first Afghanistan and then Iraq, the 
world has witnessed an enormous 
proliferation of private military and 
security companies (PMSCs) seeking 
to profit from instability and conflict. 
Hundreds of companies have been 
established in the past few years alone, 
and there now exists a vast private 
industry worth hundreds of billions  
of dollars.1 Sadly, rather than 
introducing binding regulation of the 
industry, the British government has 
decided to allow the mercenaries to 
regulate themselves.
In 2006, three years after the invasion of Iraq, 
War on Want published a groundbreaking 
report on corporate mercenaries, 
documenting the increasingly central role 
of PMSCs in the continuing occupation. 
The report linked the rise of PMSCs with 
increasing human rights abuses, a flourishing 
weapons trade and political destabilisation.  At 
that time, with the companies operating in a 
complete legal vacuum, we made an urgent 
appeal for a ban on PMSCs in conflict zones, 
strict public scrutiny requirements and an end 
to the revolving door between senior defence 
and security officials and the industry. 
This briefing provides an update on the 
mercenary industry, detailing the latest 
developments in the murky world of these 
‘guns for hire’. UK companies continue to 
dominate the industry, and can be found at 
the forefront both in the conflict zones of 
the ‘war on terror’ and in the expansion to 
Africa and the high seas.  The use of private 
armies by governments and corporations was 
previously an exception. It is now becoming 
the norm, as states and companies seek to 
evade responsibility for the use of violent and 
often deadly force.  The industry will continue 
to grow unchecked unless it is brought  
under control. 
Voluntary codes like the 2010 International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security  
Service Providers (ICoC) are not the answer 
to the culture of impunity that PMSCs 
enjoy. Such codes are used by companies 
to legitimise existing industry practice and 
to block the introduction of legally binding 
regulation.  The UN Human Rights Council 
has been developing a binding convention for 
the regulation of PMSCs at the international 
level, and Switzerland has introduced new 
legislation banning all Swiss-based PMSCs 
from operating in conflict zones.  The UK 
government, by contrast, has consistently 
backed standards for the PMSC industry  
that are based on self-regulation, not  
public accountability. 
War on Want believes that the privatisation 
of war must end, and that PMSCs must be 
banned altogether from operating in conflict 
zones.  Voluntary self-regulation for this lethal 
industry is unacceptable. National regulation, 
alongside legally binding international 
mechanisms, is long overdue.
John Hilary
Executive Director
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1 UK: mercenary kingpin
The UK is an important hub for the 
PMSC industry.  At the height of 
the occupation, around 60 British 
companies operated in Iraq.2 Now 
there are hundreds of British PMSCs 
operating in areas of conflict around the 
globe, working to secure government 
and corporate presence against a range 
of ‘threats’. 
The leading British PMSCs are sprawling 
corporate entities, with complex structures 
and a global footprint. Companies like G4S 
(which acquired ArmorGroup in 2008),  Aegis 
Defence Services (now part of GardaWorld), 
Control Risks and Olive Group make 
hundreds of millions of pounds in profit 
each year from the industry, and come 
complete with PR departments and marketing 
teams.  The result has been a proliferation 
of euphemistic branding: this is an era of 
‘risk management consultancy’ and ‘security 
solutions’, provided to ‘clients’ operating in 
‘high-risk and complex environments’.
At the heart of the industry is a revolving 
door between PMSCs, military, intelligence and 
corporate worlds, with the interests of these 
sectors closely intertwined. No fewer than 
14 companies are based in Hereford, close to 
the headquarters of the SAS, while at least 46 
companies employ former members of the UK 
Special Forces.3  Many of the smaller PMSCs 
consist entirely of ex-military personnel, 
and the larger corporations have ex-military 
personnel in key posts. As Graham Binns, 
CEO of Aegis Defence Services and former 
Armoured Brigade Commander, said: “In the 
world of business, ex-military people have got 
a lot to offer – I certainly hope so anyway.”4
“If you want peace, prepare for war.” Contractors at PMSC training camp, April 2015
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Examples of former military personnel in key posts  
• Olive Group’s executive board 
is made up of ex-British military 
personnel – including the co-
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, 
all three Vice Presidents and the 
Director for Crisis Response.5 
• 3e Global employs a team “drawn 
from Government, Intelligence and 
Specialist Military backgrounds. All 
of whom have trained and operated 
to the highest echelons within the 
UK and worldwide.” The company 
offers a range of services, including 
“covert technical surveillance” for 
corporations to “monitor staff or 
employees” and “identify the source 
of information leaks or internal 
issues”.6 
• Control Risks has many key 
management posts filled by  
ex-members of the military and 
intelligence services. The company’s 
Middle East operations are overseen 
by Andreas Carleton-Smith, 
 
 
an ex-SAS officer, while its Iraq 
operations are headed by David 
Amos, an ex-officer in the British 
Army, who now leads more than 
1,200 people with 340 armoured 
vehicles in sites across the 
country. Eddie Everett, formerly 
of the Special Forces, manages 
the company’s Global Client 
Services, while Jim Brooks is 
CEO of its American arm. Brooks 
is ex-CIA, and worked for the 
Agency supporting its worldwide 
paramilitary operations, and as 
a Navy SEAL advisor to Latin 
American security services.7 
• Aegis Defence Services boasts 
Nicholas Soames, former UK 
government Minister for the Armed 
Forces, as its Chairman and Graham 
Binns, a former Commander  
of the 7th Armoured Brigade  
and Commandant of the Joint 
Services Command and Staff 
College, as CEO.8
03
within PMSCs include:
At the heart of the industry is a revolving door between PMSCs, 
military, intelligence and corporate worlds, with the interests 
of these sectors closely intertwined.
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2 Iraq: mercenary incubator 
The British PMSC industry took off 
with the occupation of Iraq and the 
resulting unrest.  The Director General 
of the British Association of Private 
Security Companies, Andy Bearpark, 
has made clear: “In Iraq in 2003 and 
2004 money was basically free. That 
meant contracts were being let for 
ridiculous amounts of money – millions 
and millions of dollars of contracts 
being pumped into the industry.  The 
industry exploded in terms of the 
volume of business on the back of Iraq.”9 
UK firms like Aegis Defence Services, 
ArmorGroup (now a subsidiary of G4S), 
Control Risks and Olive Group snapped 
up large contracts. 
As the large-scale military occupation of 
the country by US and UK troops wound 
down, PMSC roles there expanded in scope. 
Security operations which were once the 
preserve of the occupying armed forces were 
outsourced, with UK companies remaining 
key players. Aegis Defence Services, for 
example, is one of several PMSCs under 
contract from the US military providing 
services to the Pentagon’s programme for 
training and equipping Iraqi security forces 
under the Office of Security Cooperation’s 
Iraq programme.10  The company has also 
been hired by the governor of Basra to 
replace the British troops who have left. Aegis 
Defence Services, whose chief executive 
Graham Binns led the attack on Basra in 2003 
and later supervised the handover to Iraqi 
security forces, was contracted to establish  
a ‘ring of steel’ around the city and to  
provide training for Iraqi intelligence units.11  
The US and Iraqi governments are not  
the only players that continue to pay for  
the services of UK PMSCs in Iraq.  
The UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
has awarded contracts to PMSCs in conflict  
zones with a combined value of around  
£50 million each year.  This includes  
nearly £150 million in the five years  
between 2007 and 2012 awarded for 
operations in Iraq.12
Perhaps the biggest market for British 
PMSCs in Iraq is the provision of security 
for private corporations seeking to invest 
in the country.  Such contracts have become 
critical to the private security sector now 
that the Pentagon’s war chest in the country 
has emptied. As one industry executive put 
it in late 2012: “Everyone is looking for work 
that is not OCA-funded [i.e. from the US 
occupation budget]. It’s going to be like when 
the tide goes out at the beach...” 13 
The oil and gas sector is the central focus 
of multinational corporations in Iraq. Royal 
Dutch Shell, BP, ExxonMobil and other 
multinationals have signed deals to produce, 
refine and export oil and gas from the 
country, and are willing to pay PMSCs to help 
secure their operations.14  Aegis Defence 
Services boasts that the company’s “largest 
area of business is Iraq”, and that it “has 
been operating in support of the oil and 
gas sector for over two years”, providing 
“a full security service including Command, 
Control and Information, Mobile, and 
Static Security Services on major oilfields 
for international oil companies as well as 
oil service providers”. The dedicated Iraq 
team also provides intelligence services for 
Perhaps the biggest market 
for British PMSCs in Iraq is 
the provision of security for 
private corporations seeking 
to invest in the country.
drawing up “personality profiles”, identifying 
“legal and regulatory obstacles” and reaching 
“into the very heart of the Iraqi political 
and commercial establishment”.15 Likewise, 
Control Risks has seen huge increases to 
its operating profits, largely due to “higher 
workload in the Middle East and a gush of 
contracts in Iraq.”16
UK multinational G4S is the world’s largest 
private security company. Its 2008 acquisition 
of the UK’s biggest mercenary company, 
ArmorGroup, granted G4S access to the 
private military and security market in Iraq, as 
ArmorGroup had previously won a number 
of significant contracts in the country. G4S 
was subsequently found by a coroner’s 
inquiry to have failed in its duty to conduct a 
proper vetting process in its employment of 
ex-serviceman Danny Fitzsimons, who shot 
dead two other private security contractors 
in Iraq in 2009 and was sentenced to 20 
years’ imprisonment for their murder.17  
Despite this, G4S announced in September 
2015 that it had secured a new contract 
worth up to $270 million to provide security 
services to the Basra Gas Company.  At the 
same time, the company successfully renewed 
its contract to provide security services to 
the British embassy in Afghanistan, to the 
value of £100 million over five years.18 G4S is 
the target of an international campaign over 
its complicity in the Israeli oppression of the 
Palestinian people, as it provides equipment 
and services to prisons and detention centres 
where Palestinian political prisoners are held, 
and to military checkpoints along the illegal 
Apartheid Wall.
05
PMSC contractors at scene of bomb attack in Baghdad 
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3 Emerging markets: Africa
While Iraq and Afghanistan remain 
longstanding markets for British PMSCs, 
instability in other resource-rich regions of 
the world, such as northern and western 
Africa, is leading to increased opportunities 
for these companies.  All major UK PMSCs 
now operate across the continent. Aegis 
Defence Services claims it has experience 
in 18 African states, including resource-
rich Angola, Niger, Nigeria, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Central African 
Republic, where it provides “protective 
security for multinationals in very high-risk 
environments”.19  G4S, meanwhile, makes 
over a third of its profits in the “emerging 
markets business”, with annual turnover of 
around £500 million in Africa.  According to 
Andy Baker, head of African operations for 
the company, “Demand has been very high 
across Africa.  The nature of our business is 
such that in high-risk environments the need 
for our services increases.” Multinationals 
have approached the company for  
‘pan-African security deals’, and G4S, whose 
clients include Royal Dutch Shell and 
AngloGold Ashanti, is known to be targeting 
the natural resources sector.20 
Smaller PMSCs also operate throughout the 
continent, often for extractive corporations 
looking to secure their assets against loss or 
damage from local unrest. One such UK-
based PMSC, Special Projects and Services 
Ltd, is based alongside the SAS headquarters 
in Hereford, and lists among its past 
achievements working alongside government 
forces in an unnamed West African state to 
secure a mine site that had been overrun.21 
The toppling of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime 
in Libya in 2011 led to a rapid influx of 
PMSCs into the country, spearheading the 
Nigeria is using PMSC mercenaries against Boko Haram
©
 A
P/
Pr
es
s A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
Im
ag
es
/Je
ro
m
e 
D
el
ay
 
arrival of multinationals keen to restore 
their involvement in Libya’s oil and gas 
sector. As one PMSC executive put it: “We’re 
there to facilitate the re-entry of clients in 
Libya.”22 Security companies have also seen 
an opportunity for training post-Gaddafi 
security forces and, compared to the former 
regime, Intelligence Online noted that “Libya’s 
new leadership is showing greater openness 
toward foreign private security companies.”23  
Again, British companies are leading the 
way. Just days after Gaddafi’s death, the UK 
company Trango Special Projects was touting 
for business among prospective investors: 
“Whilst speculation continues regarding 
Qaddafi’s killing,” it said on its website, 
“are you and your business ready to return 
to Libya?” At the same time, one online 
forum for security recruitment, the Security 
Contracting Network, was emphasising 
opportunities in the country: “There will be 
an uptick of activity as foreign oil companies 
scramble to get back to Libya. Keep an eye on 
who wins related contracts, follow the money, 
and find your next job.”24  
Other UK PMSCs operating in Libya include 
Control Risks, Olive Group, AKE and Blue 
Mountain, a company whose name is derived 
from a poem inscribed on a clock tower 
at the headquarters of the SAS.25  SNE 
Special Projects, another UK company, is 
run by Jason Woods, an ex-soldier with 
the Parachute Regiment who has acted as 
a ‘security consultant’ for Control Risks 
Group, specialising in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry.26  SNE claims that it was 
“one of the first security companies to 
establish a permanent presence in Libya 
post-revolution”, and that it “specialises in 
supporting oil and gas companies in hostile 
and remote environments around the  
world, particularly in North Africa with 
ongoing operations in Libya, Egypt and 
Algeria.”27  SicuroGroup, run by ex-British 
military personnel including former  
members of Special Forces and military 
intelligence, operates throughout West  
and East Africa, and also has a significant  
contract for “an international oil and  
gas company re-establishing operations  
in Libya.”28 
PMSCs from several countries are now 
being contracted to take up active combat 
roles in ongoing wars within African and 
Middle Eastern states.  The Nigerian army 
has secured the services of South African 
mercenary troops from the apartheid era to 
fight the militant Islamist group Boko Haram 
in the north of the country, while hundreds 
of Colombian mercenaries recruited by 
the infamous US PMSC Blackwater (now 
renamed Academi) have been fighting 
alongside Saudi Arabian forces in Yemen.29  
According to its former director, Nick 
Buckles, G4S has also benefited from the 
unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, 
“with particularly strong growth in Egypt, 
Yemen and Bahrain.”30  G4S was involved in 
the evacuation of high-ranking government 
officials, multinational employees and  
embassy staff during the 2011 uprising in 
Egypt, and saw its revenues in that country 
double to approximately £8 million between 
2007 and 2011.31
07
Just days after Gaddafi ’s 
death, the UK company 
Trango Special Projects 
was touting for  
business among 
prospective investors.
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4 Militarising the oceans
The use of private armies in the maritime 
industry is booming, and British companies 
are again at the forefront. Over half of 
the member companies of the Security 
Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) 
are British. In the north-west Indian Ocean 
alone, SAMI estimates there are more than 
200 PMSCs operating in a sector worth $500 
million per year and growing. According to 
Professor Chris Kinsey at King’s College 
London, British PMSCs are “following the cash 
cow.... putting armed contractors on ships is 
something the British are particularly good at, 
and they seem to be the ones dominating this 
particular type of security activity.”32  
Many maritime security companies are 
filled with ex-Navy and ex-Special Forces 
personnel, and carry military grade 
equipment. Indeed, one such company has 
built a private navy of three large boats, each 
capable of carrying 40 private marines and 
equipped with a helicopter and drones.33  
According to G4S, enhancing the security 
of trade vessels in the Indian Ocean is “a 
big commercial opportunity”. The company 
provides armed guards, as well as tactical and 
strategic advice, to a range of oil and other 
corporations seeking to secure their assets 
through major sea lanes.34  This opportunity 
has only increased since October 2011, 
when British Prime Minister David Cameron 
formally authorised the use of private armed 
guards on board UK-registered ships.35 
The militarisation of the oceans is having 
significant consequences. PMSCs have shot 
indiscriminately at approaching vessels, 
sometimes resulting in the deaths of innocent 
fishermen.36 In one videotaped incident, 
leaked after it was played by the US PMSC 
Trident Group Inc. at a shipping conference, 
armed personnel were seen firing without 
warning on two skiffs which had approached 
the vessel. Company President Thomas 
Rothrauff acknowledged that those on board 
were probably killed, although the exact 
extent of injuries and the real intent of those 
in the skiff remains unknown: “We’re not in 
the business of counting injuries,” he said. 
According to one captain working in the 
Indian Ocean, “It’s the Wild Wild West out 
there. There are no regulations or vetting 
process for these teams. The company doesn’t 
know who it’s getting on board.”37
The presence of private armies on board 
ships can contravene local and international 
law, and security companies have been known 
to buy arms illegally in war-torn countries 
such as Yemen, and then dump them 
overboard before reaching their destination. 
According to one contractor: “Given that 
you can get an AK-47 for about $200 in most 
big African towns and it costs about $1,000 
per weapon to do it legally, and then there’s 
all the forms, coastguard licences etc., a lot 
of people think it’s easier to buy weapons 
illegally and drop them [overboard] when you 
get out of the danger area.”38
UK PMSCs have not avoided such 
controversy. One instance concerns 
contractors working for the UK company 
Protection Vessels International Ltd (PVI), 
a signatory to the International Code 
of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers (ICoC) and the self-proclaimed 
“global leader in armed maritime security”.39 
It’s the Wild Wild West 
out there. There are no 
regulations or vetting 
process for these teams. 
The company doesn’t know 
who it’s getting on board.”
“
PVI was established in 2008 by senior 
former military personnel, with “the express 
purpose of applying military standards of 
security… to the commercial arena of the 
world’s shipping trade routes”, and the team 
is “drawn from the highest echelons of UK 
Royal Marines, UK government intelligence 
and commerce”.  The company trumpets its 
extensive experience in Special Forces and 
military intelligence, and armed personnel are 
deployed in four-strong teams and “supplied 
with the latest equipment – from weapons to 
communications technology”. PVI personnel 
were arrested by Eritrean officials in 2011 and 
charged with espionage, sabotage, terrorism 
and ‘acts of invasion’. They had been using 
Eritrean territory to stash sniper rifles, pistol 
silencers and tracer bullets, in an episode for 
which the company later apologised.40
To avoid such problems in the future, 
companies are increasingly exploiting a 
legal loophole regarding the use of arms in 
international waters, and are making use of 
‘floating armouries’. These armouries are 
ships harboured at sea, stacked with high-
powered rifles, ammunition, night-vision 
goggles and other military-grade equipment. 
There are now at least 20 such armouries 
dotted throughout the Indian Ocean, and 
PMSCs either store their equipment on 
board these ships or hire weapons from the 
operating companies. Either way, PMSCs can 
operate without fear of legal repercussions.41
  
To further ensure that companies are 
uninhibited by regulation, they often register 
the ships carrying the armouries in states 
with light-touch regulation. Sea Marshals Ltd,  
MNG Resolution, a UK-run floating armoury moored in international waters 
of the Indian Ocean 
09
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for example, is a Cardiff-based PMSC 
employing ex-Navy and Special Forces 
personnel using “military grade weapons” 
throughout the Indian Ocean.42  The company 
operates a floating armoury in the middle of 
the Red Sea, using ships registered in  
land-locked Mongolia.43
One of the largest providers of offshore 
armouries is Avant Garde Maritime Services 
(AGMS), a subsidiary of the largest Sri Lankan 
PMSC, Avant Garde Security Services, which 
has entered into a joint venture with the Sri 
Lankan government to provide a range of ex-
military weapons to PMSCs. On its website, 
AGMS boasts that it is a “proud Signatory 
Company of the ICoC”, and declares its 
mission to become “the most sought after 
supplier of weapons and associated items to 
private maritime security companies”. The 
company offers weapons owned by the  
Sri Lankan government, including assault  
rifles, machine guns and night-vision  
equipment, and the Advisory Board  
consists of high ranking Sri Lankan military 
officers.44  According to the company’s 
chairman, there are “thousands” of  
weapons on board the ships, with  
hundreds of movements on and off the 
armouries each month.45
Although initially the UK government did 
not allow British companies to exploit this 
loophole, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office was clear from early on that they were 
engaged with “interested parties, including the 
Sri Lankan authorities”, and that they were 
“determined to find a solution that allows 
British companies to compete for contracts 
in a fair and transparent manner”.46  In 
August 2013 the UK Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills issued 50 licences for 
floating armouries operating in the Indian 
Ocean and Gulf of Aden.47 
On board the MNG Resolution, a UK-run floating armoury moored in international waters 
of the Indian Ocean 
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The International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Service Providers 
(ICoC) is a voluntary code of conduct 
launched in 2010 that was developed 
out of discussions between PMSCs, 
governments and civil society. Its stated 
aim is to establish a set of principles for 
the industry based on international law, 
as well as to improve the accountability 
of PMSCs by establishing an 
independent oversight mechanism with 
responsibility for certification, auditing, 
monitoring and reporting. 
The US government subsequently funded 
international security trade association ASIS 
to develop an auditable standard for PMSCs 
operating around the world. The standard, 
named PSC.1, is based on principles drawn 
up with the involvement of the military 
establishment and the PMSC industry itself, 
relying on self-regulation and voluntary 
reporting rather than binding regulations 
with redress mechanisms and sanctions. 
The UK government swiftly adopted the 
PSC.1 standard as the applicable standard 
for British PMSCs operating overseas, and 
in September 2015 it was published in the 
International Standards series as ISO 18788. A 
parallel standard has been developed for the 
maritime security industry, published in April 
2015 as ISO 28007-1.
The ICoC Association (ICoCA) was launched 
at a conference in Geneva in September 2013, 
at which point 708 companies had formally 
signed up to the ICoC. The UK, along with 
Australia, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA, 
was a founding member of the ICoCA. The 
disparity between civil society and industry 
involvement in the initiative was glaring: 13 
civil society organisations joined the ICoCA 
as founding members compared with 135 
PMSCs, meaning that the body developed 
to regulate PMSCs is dominated by them. 
The ICoCA formally recognised the PSC.1 
standard in September 2015 as an appropriate 
basis for certification that individual PMSCs 
meet the principles of the ICoC.
The ICoCA fails as a credible 
instrument in key areas such as 
governance, monitoring, redress, 
sanctions, and state responsibility: 
Governance: The Board includes Major 
General Charles Tucker, who has served as 
a legal expert in various positions in the 
US military, and Chris Sanderson, Director 
Government Support for Control Risks since 
2005, who served as the first chairman of 
SCEG, the UK trade association partnered 
with the British government for regulation 
of UK private security providers operating 
overseas. Because of the dominance of PMSC 
and military figures in the governance of the 
ICoCA, many civil society organisations have 
refused to participate.
Monitoring: Field-based investigations 
may be initiated by the Executive Director, 
but the ICoCA Board can decide against 
them. These investigations “shall be aimed at 
improving performance or addressing specific 
compliance concerns”. However, the ICoCA 
Secretariat’s capacity to independently 
monitor member companies through field 
visits is extremely limited. 
Redress: The ICoCA is reliant on the  
grievance mechanisms of the companies 
themselves. It can only provide advice on 
the effectiveness of those mechanisms and 
suggest alternative grievance avenues should 
a complainant not feel comfortable lodging 
a complaint through the member company’s 
grievance mechanism. The ICoCA is not 
empowered to decide on a complaint or 
to award any reparations. In practice this 
means that the victims of PMSC human rights 
violations are unable to seek redress via  
the ICoCA. 
5 ICoC: fig leaf  for PMSCs
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Sanctions: The ICoCA does not have 
clear sanctions for companies that violate 
its principles, and because there are so 
many different certification processes for 
PMSCs (either through ICoCA or national 
certification programmes), an effective 
sanction ending in termination of a company’s 
certification is not feasible.
State responsibility: The only requirement 
is for a state to “communicate their intent 
to support the principles of the ICoC and 
participate in the activities of the Association” 
(3.3.2). In the absence of a commitment not 
to use PMSCs that are not certified under 
the ICoCA, states can continue to contract 
companies which violate human rights  
with impunity. 
It is clear that the ICoC and ICoCA act as fig 
leaves for the PMSC industry to legitimise its 
actions. Voluntary codes allow corporations 
to set the terms of their own operations. 
What is needed is national regulation, 
including a complete ban on the use of 
PMSCs in conflict zones, alongside legally 
binding international mechanisms. 
As described in the next and final section 
of this report, War on Want supports the 
initiative under the auspices of the UN 
Human Rights Council in Geneva to create 
an international legally binding framework 
regulating the activities of PMSCs around the 
world, and calls on the UK government to 
introduce binding controls on PMSCs as a 
matter of urgency.
Launch ceremony for the ICoCA, Geneva, September 2013
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As the number of boots on the ground of 
occupying forces has fallen, public attention 
has turned away from Iraq and Afghanistan 
and the private armies which gained notoriety 
there. Away from the public gaze, the business 
of PMSCs has boomed. From dependency on 
Pentagon contracts, they have found a wealth 
of new and eager clients amongst the private 
sector, especially in the extractive industries. 
They have sought out and exploited political 
instability in the wake of the Arab uprisings. 
And they have spread floating armouries 
across the world’s oceans to protect 
commercial shipping interests. In all of this, 
UK companies are playing a leading role, 
reaping enormous profits. 
PMSCs have a track record of profiting from 
war and conflict. Despite facing numerous 
accusations of human rights abuses in conflict 
situations around the world, they remain 
unaccountable and unregulated.  Ten years ago, 
War on Want mounted a campaign calling 
for binding regulation of this dangerous 
industry, including a complete ban on the use 
of PMSCs in conflict zones.  The campaign 
was successful in bringing the need for PMSC 
accountability to international attention, and 
in 2010 the UN Human Rights Council in 
Geneva debated the first draft of a possible 
Convention on Private Military and Security 
Companies. The draft has since been reviewed 
by a dedicated intergovernmental working 
group, whose fourth session in April 2015 
discussed revisions to the text in advance of 
submitting its analysis of the global situation 
to the UN General Assembly in 2016.
There have also been positive moves at the 
national level. With effect from September 
2015, the Swiss government has banned all 
PMSCs based in Switzerland from operating 
in conflict zones, and has introduced strict 
regulation of all PMSC activity outside its 
borders. The UK government, by contrast, 
argues that PMSCs are best left to police 
themselves through voluntary codes.  
It’s time to get binding regulation of 
Private Military and Security Companies 
back on the UK government’s agenda. 
6 Take action
Act now: 
1. Write to your MP raising the issue of PMSC accountability and the need for 
binding regulation at both national and international levels, in place of the 
self-regulation mechanisms favoured by the UK government up to now. 
2. Order more copies of this briefing and other campaign materials for your 
events, stalls, student unions, union branches, local groups, family and friends 
at waronwant.org/materials. 
3. Get involved with our Stop G4S campaign in order to put pressure on G4S 
to end its complicity with Israel’s oppression of the Palestinian people; visit 
waronwant.org/StopG4S for regular updates.
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